

## **BCA** Interoperability Demonstration

### **Motorola NSM PKI**

David Moyer (410) 859-8319 David.Moyer@email.mot.com

8 September 1999



# BCA Demonstration: Motorola Involvement


- ■Motorola is the current provider of the DoD High Assurance PKI: NSM
- ■This demonstration provides a unique opportunity to add useful capabilities to NSM and ring out issues in a test environment
- **■**Provide an NSM hierarchy for the demonstration
- ■Investigate the technical, implementation, and policy issues associated with cross certifying the DoD high assurance PKI with the Bridge CA
- ■Add Cross Certification and RSA capability to the DoD High Assurance PKI to support the Bridge CA Cross Certification Demonstration



POC Name: David Moyer Phone No. (410) 859-8319

# Current Motorola NSM High Assurance PKI

**ICRLA** 



#### Hierarchy includes 3 levels

•PAA: Policy Approving Authority

•PCA: Policy Creation Authority

•CA: Certification Authority

#### **Additional Elements**


•ICRLA: Indirect CRL Authority

•RA: Registration Authority



POC Name: **David Mover** Phone No. (410) 859-8319

## **Bridge CA Cross Certification Demonstration: NSM PKI** Representation



Demonstration Setup and Significant Simplifying Assumptions

- DoD high assurance test hierarchy set up including a PAA, PCA, and CA
- Certification Authorities instantiated on Trusted Solaris **Platforms**
- Cross Certification enabled at the PAA level
- •ICRLA and certificate distribution points extension not instantiated
- •Certificates created using the test policy OID, not the high assurance or medium assurance OID that would be normal
- •Signature certificate capability only tested in this demonstration

CA

User Base



## **NSM** Unique Features

- ■NSM developed for the DoD with some specific DoD unique requirements
- ■Primary user is the Defense Message System (DMS)
- **■**High Assurance Software Security Architecture
  - Operating System: Trusted Solaris or SCO CMW+
  - Software Architecture separates trusted & untrusted processes
  - Software uses Trusted OS access control & role separation features
  - Design incorporated feedback from penetration testing of earlier MISSI CAWs
  - Robust Profiling & Penetration testing by NSA
- ■FORTEZZA (DSA, KEA, Skipjack) and LYNKS (added RSA) card supported
- ■Supports Multiple Algorithm Universal sets to enable domain separation
- ■CA CRLs are full and complete CRLs, additionally, CA revocation and CA/Subscriber compromise data sent to an ICRL Authority for more immediate compromise information dissemination

5



## **NSM** Key Features

- **■**Extensible design capable of supporting:
  - Multiple algorithms (DSA, RSA, KEA)
  - Multiple security policies (DoD Class 3 and 4)
  - Subject Directory Attributes Extension used for access control and privilege information
  - Flexible security: Security Privilege Info Files (SPIF)
- **■**Organizational Certificate Management
  - Supports 5 levels of traceability
    - From total traceability to hidden traceability to total anonymity
  - Management of shared encryption key certificates
- **■**Multiple Directory Support
  - Can master certificates and CRLs on multiple Directories
  - Operates through the High Assurance Guard



POC Name: David Moyer Phone No. (410) 859-8319

### **NSM Infrastructure Summary**

